Since the 2023 talks, the Yemeni peace process has essentially stalled throughout 2024 and into 2025. The Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen (OSESGY) now appears to be the only actor actively pursuing the peace roadmap,, where numerous obstacles continue to hinder progress, according to an analysis published by the Italian Think Tank Istituto Analisi Relazioni Internazionali (IARI).
Alessandro Mariani, The author of the analysis suggested that “There can be no lasting peace unless Yemeni parties — under the mediation of key actors such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the UN, and Oman — reach a meaningful agreement on a renewed ceasefire and a comprehensive peace roadmap among themselves.
He added: In any case, it is nearly impossible that the parties would reach an agreement that satisfies all stakeholders, especially given the fundamentally opposing positions on issues such as national unity versus southern secession.
The author envisaged 4 scenarios for the near future of Yemen:
Scenario 1: Agreement between The Presidential Leadership Council of the Internationally Recognized Government of Yemen (PLC), The Southern Transitional Council (STC) , and The Houthi rebels. Under its terms, the STC secures independence and officially establishes the new South Yemen State.
Scenario 2: PLC and STC agree to partition with the Houthi rebels. As a result, Yemen is divided into two States: a northwestern State ruled by the Houthis in Sana’a, and a southern State ruled by a coalition government that includes Saudi-backed former PLC members, STC representatives, and figures from other Yemeni parties.
Scenario 3: Yemen’s territory remains fragmented among rival factions. No progress is made in nationwide peace talks and no renewed ceasefire is signed. The rivalry between the Internationally Recognized Government (IRGY) and the Houthis persists, and the PLC/Saudi Arabia-STC/UAE competition goes on across various parts of the country. This scenario basically represents the prosecution of the current situation. The 2022 ceasefire remains fragile, with a permanent risk of its full collapse and a return to intense and widespread armed clashes.
Scenario 4: Yemen falls back into open civil war. The Houthis and Saudi-backed members of the PLC — under Riyadh’s mediation — attempt to reach an agreement to keep the country united, through a division of areas of influence. In response, the STC decides to oust President al-Alimi and other Saudi-aligned PLC members, and unilaterally declares the independence of a new South Yemen State. Clashes between the Houthis and STC-affiliated forces resume, with Houthis attempting to recapture Aden after ten years. The UAE could then enter the conflict, seeing the potential Houthi recapture of southern Yemen as a threat to their interests in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea region. A similar logic could be applied to Saudi Arabia: indeed it is likely that Riyadh would act, in particular attempting to prevent the STC from ousting some members of the PLC and secede from a unified Yemen. Contemporarily, PLC-affiliated forces are likely to join the hostilities, as President al-Alimi’s influence would further diminish in the event of an Aden takeover, whether by the hand of the Houthis or the STC.
The author concluded that the third scenario definitely appears to be the most likely. With no significant progress on the peace roadmap in sight, and with Yemen’s key political actors currently not engaging in direct talks to achieve lasting stability, prospects for a negotiated resolution remain weak. Due to their fundamentally conflicting agendas, there are few chances they will ever come to the table and manage the situation all together. As a result, Yemen is expected to remain fragmented and continuously threatened by political tension that could escalate into renewed military conflict.