Despite a fierce US offensive, Houthi rebels attacks persist, exposing the limits of military force in securing Red Sea shipping and curbing Iran-backed militancy, according to an analysis published by the Observer Research Foundation.
The author Girish Luthra, a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, added “The US and the UK launched ‘Operation Poseidon Archer’ in January 2024 and conducted periodic strikes against both Houthis mobile and static targets. However, these offensive operations did not majorly degrade Houthi capabilities, and the combined offensive and defensive campaigns failed to deter continued attacks”.
Acknowledging the relatively limited impact of the cautious, intermittent approach adopted in Operation Poseidon Archer, the US President Donald Trump announced the launch of a “decisive and powerful military action” against the Houthis on 15 March 2025, under the code-name ‘Operation Rough Rider’.
The stated objectives were to compel the Houthi ‘terrorists’ to cease attacks in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, restore freedom of navigation in these strategic waterways, and pressure Iran to withdraw its support for the Houthis. An unstated but plausible objective is also further to accentuate Iran’s declining support base in the region and persuade it towards the negotiation table.
Unofficial estimates claimed that between 500 to 600 Houthi personnel were killed. Civilian casualties were also reported, though no reliable figures are available. The US was unable to establish air supremacy and suffered notable losses, including at least seven MQ-9 Reaper drones from mid-March.
In the final phase of hostilities, the Houthis launched a ballistic missile on 4 May 2025 targeting Ben-Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv, signaling their intent to continue targeting Israel. Israel retaliated, claiming the destruction of Sana’a International Airport. On the same day, 6 May, President Trump declared victory and announced a ceasefire, mediated by Oman. It was confirmed by Oman, stating that both sides had agreed not to target each other in the Red Sea. There was no immediate statement from Houthis on the ceasefire, but their linked social media handles claimed victory.
During the 52 days of Operation Rough Rider, the Houthis sustained damage to critical infrastructure and nodes, war reserves and some key personnel. However, they still retained adequate capabilities to sustain operations at a lower level.
Their assembly and supply lines for replacements and replenishment would be reactivated quickly, enabling them to regroup and rearm.
It is also important to note that while the US objective was to halt Houthi attacks across both the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, the ceasefire only covered the Red Sea. Restoring freedom of navigation meaningfully would require no attacks or threat of attacks through the entire stretch, including the Red Sea, the Strait of Bab-El Mandeb, and the Gulf of Aden.
In the short term, transits through the Suez Canal and activity at Red Sea ports may improve, though broader security concerns remain. Politically, the Houthis’ control over their territories has remained firm, and whether this operation has influenced Iran’s strategic calculations remains uncertain.