While presented as a US-Houthi agreement, the ceasefire in Yemen, brokered by Oman, is consistent with a well-established pattern by Iran: directing proxies to dial violence up or down as strategic circumstances demand, all while benefiting from the perception of these groups being autonomous, as long seen in the cases of Lebanese Hezbollah or Shiite militias in Iraq, according to an analysis published by The Atlantic Council.
The authors of the analysis, Fatima Abo Alasrar and Benham Ben Taleblu added: “This duplicitous approach, extending a diplomatic handshake while concealing the knife of proxy warfare, is precisely how Iran extends its influence beyond its actual capabilities”.
Abo Alasrar and Ben Taleblu thought that “Over the past decade, Iran has become the Houthis’ most important foreign backer, providing them with missiles, drones, and other military-grade components. Additionally, Tehran aides Houthi sanctions-busting and illicit revenue generation efforts. Through the Houthis, Iran has put state-level military capabilities into the hands of a non-state actor in Yemen”.
For the Islamic Republic, wrote Abo Alasrar and Ben Taleblu, preserving assets and living to fight another day is something of an art form. Tehran is cognizant of growing vulnerabilities at home and abroad, and is offering tactical concessions to create the impression of a “win” for its adversaries, particularly in Trump’s Washington. For instance, during the Vienna nuclear talks, Iranian officials repeatedly stated they had shown “tactical flexibility on technical points” while maintaining “core red lines.” Iran’s foreign minister insisted that the country’s strategic objectives remained intact. This pattern mirrors Iran’s behavior during the 2015 nuclear deal, where it accepted temporary limits on its nuclear program but refused to negotiate over its ballistic missile arsenal or regional proxy networks. This approach allows Tehran to benefit from diplomatic engagement, even short-term ceasefires, without altering its core security objectives.
Abo Alasrar and Ben Taleblu concluded that “By being the driving force behind the Houthi ceasefire, Tehran can frame its regional weakness as goodwill, thereby strengthening its case for something in return”.